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Balancing between the Career and Position-based Systems. 
Some Aspects of Recent Developments in Civil Service 
Legislation in Hungary
Abstract. This article analyses some aspects of the wavering course the Hungarian civil service is taking between 
the career and position-based systems. Since the turn of the new millennium a number of new measures have been 
introduced in civil service legislation. These reforms have pushed the employment system of the civil service in 
two directions simultaneously. While some of the new elements have aimed at dismantling what had been a quite 
typical career-based system, others have further entrenched it. These very frequent, detailed, but less than consistent 
amendments to the civil service legislation have resulted in a climate of uncertainty. It remains to be seen which 
tendency will prevail in the coming years.
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I.  Historical backgrounds before the naissance of the organic civil service code, 
in brief
The ﬁ rst steps towards creating a professional civil service in Hungary were taken in the 
third quarter of the 19th century. Since that time a great number of measures have been 
implemented to regulate the legal relationships of state employees. Up until the outbreak of 
the First World War, a strongly career based civil service system was created in our country, 
with all of characteristics of the Weberian-type civil service, regulated by many arborescent 
legal instruments. No uniﬁ ed civil service code has existed to date, but every element of the 
ideal-typical career civil service system1 was regulated, except what is surely the most 
important one: for the recruiting and selection of civil servants there existed no uniﬁ ed 
regularization.2 
The career civil service system existed until the end of the Second World War. After 
the subsequent elections, the winning communist party wanted to control all the important 
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posts in public administration and thus polish off the ancien régime. So, the public 
administration became “cleared” of all of the professional civil servants of the “rotten” old 
regime. The newly created posts were ﬁ lled with faithful party-comrades, no matter if they 
were ill-educated and incompetent at carrying out the tasks of administration. The direct 
and inevitable consequence of these actions was the radical and disastrous decrease in the 
working standards of the administration.3 As in those days it was the state, which exclusively 
owned all companies, the communist party proclaimed that there was no need to regulate 
the employment relationships of people serving in administration differently to those of 
other employees working in any branch of the economy. Legally speaking, by using the 
ﬁ ction of all employees working for the state–no matter if they worked in industry, 
agriculture, education or administration–all belonged organically under the scope of the 
nationwide applicable, unitary labour code. From the 70s and 80s onwards, however, it was 
gradually recognized that the tasks of public administration differ in several respects from 
other occupations. Consequently, various measures were taken over the years in order to 
accentuate the differences in the regulation of these employment relationships (this has also 
been the case concerning other branches of state power–courts, state attorney ofﬁ ces, etc.). 
II. The advent of the organic civil service code
During the period of political transition in the 1990s Hungary, was the ﬁ rst country in the 
Central Eastern European region to accept a new form of civil service regulation.4 After the 
collapse of the communist regime, for the new democratic states in transition there were 
plenty of Western examples to choose from in shaping the basic institutions of the new rule 
of law, taking into consideration the requirements of the division of power, etc. This was 
also the case in shaping the new structure of public service. As the transition period in 
Hungary ran in parallel with the ﬁ rst steps of Europeanization in creating the new personnel 
system in public administration, there existed a need to settle it in a way which suited the 
standards of the European Union, too. For the Central and Eastern European Countries, the 
forming of the new personnel policy ﬁ rst of all meant the need to conceptualize a new set of 
principles for the civil service. After the change of regime in Hungary the new, democratically 
elected Parliament had to answer several fundamental questions. So, it was necessary to 
decide whether it was rational to regulate the employment relationships of public employees 
differently from the general labour code. (As was mentioned earlier, in the last years before 
the change of regime the differences became increasingly evident.) Furthermore, the 
question of how to delimit the notion of public service demanded an answer–in order to 
decide whether all employees of the state and municipalities should belong under the scope 
of a single framework code, or whether the different categories of the public service should 
be subject to different codes depending on their various special characteristics. There was 
also another question to be answered, namely, where the regulatory dividing line between 
elected ofﬁ cers and employed professionals lay. Finally, there was the fundamental question 
of where to draw the demarcation line between the political sphere and the executive power.
3 Lőrincz.: A személyzeti politika változásának szakaszai… (The Changes of Periods in Personnel 
Policy…). op. cit.; Lőrincz: A szocialista zsákmányrendszertől… (From the Spoil System in 
Socialisme…). op. cit. 
4 Balázs, I.: Rugalmasság a közigazgatásban (Flexibility in Public Administration). In: Fogarasi, 
J. (ed.): A közigazgatás személyi állománya (The Personnel of Public Administration). Budapest, 
1995.
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In response to these questions and the prevailing circumstances the Hungarian 
Parliament gave their answer in 1992, by accepting several codes regulating the employment 
relationships of different categories of persons employed by the state and private sectors. 
This year also saw the passing of code No 23 of 1992 regulating the legal relationships of 
the civil service organically, but separately from the employees belonging under the scope 
of the general labour code and also separately from other categories of the public service, 
who–depending on their status and special characteristics–belonged under the scope of 
other codes. The code on the civil service enumerated the types and speciﬁ ed the concrete 
organs which employed civil servants. These were the organisations of the public 
administration on central, territorial and local level–both in the state administration and in 
municipalities. (In addition there are some ofﬁ ces of other state organs which also employ 
civil servants to run the ofﬁ ces of these state organs.5) Other categories of public employees 
include public servants, judges, state attorneys, ofﬁ cers of armed forces, etc.–their legal 
status and employment relationships are regulated by separate laws. In Hungary elected 
ofﬁ cers do not fall under the notion of “public employee”. The basic and “background” law 
for employment relationships is the Labour Code.
The civil service code passed in 1992 was the ﬁ rst in Hungary to regulate the legal and 
employment relationships of civil servants organically, but many other legal instruments 
(government decrees, decisions, etc.) have appeared which complement it. The structure of 
the civil service regulation of 1992 aimed to create a career civil service system–similar to 
the one which had existed until the end of World War II. In most of its dispositions and 
arrangements it has also succeeded in fulﬁ lling this endeavour. This regulation, under the 
scope of public law, determined the different elements of civil servants’ employment 
relationship, such as admission requirements, career development, promotion and 
remuneration, the training and appraisal system, the question of life-time tenure and 
dismissal, etc. However, as was also the case with the regulation from the inter-war period, 
this code did not address the question of access to the civil service; that is, recruitment and 
selection as a whole.6 
III. The context of modernisation efforts in the civil service after the millennium
Turning to the most important developments in Hungarian civil service legislation after the 
millennium, several factors ought to be mentioned, which prompted the new measures and 
also correlated with each other. These factors are part of the constant endeavour to motivate 
civil servants better, with the aim of enhancing their performance, in order to cut down the 
expenditures and costs of the public sector, and at the same time to meet the needs of 
citizens for a better public administration in the 21st century. These ideas are very common 
in discussions about civil service modernisation in the whole of the developed world. The 
5 After 18 years of this type of categorization, from June 2010 a new law (No LVIII of 2010 on 
the status of civil servants of central government) has come into force after being passed by the newly 
elected Parliament. This law draws several distinctions between the civil servants of the organs 
belonging to the central government and those of municipalities and other state organs. This paper 
does not analyse this newly published legislation.
6 Linder, V.: Versenyvizsgák a közigazgatásban (Councours in Public Administration). Magyar 
Közigazgatás, (2006) 12; Lőrincz, L.: Kiválasztás a közigazgatásban (Selection in Public Admi-
nistration). Magyar Közigazgatás, (2000) 6. és (2000) 8; Lőrincz, L.: A közigazgatás alapintézményei 
(Basic Institutions of the Public Administration). Budapest, 2005.
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tools for accomplishing these tasks have also been widely tested since the 1980s. Since 
then, in the course of different civil service reforms in various countries there have been 
many attempts to adapt the human resources management tools used in the private sphere to 
the needs of the public sector. The idea behind this was that public servants–including civil 
servants–should be motivated by the same measures as ordinary people employed on labour 
market; that the rigidity of the normatively regulated, non-responsive carrier systems should 
be lessened, and that civil servants should be personally interested in working and serving 
in a more effective and efﬁ cient way. 
In a mere 20 years, since 1992, the Hungarian civil service code has been amended 
more than 70 times.7 The most important amendments and at the same time the most 
relevant ones–in connection with the dichotomy mentioned in the title of this article–the 
career vs. position-based systems–have been introduced since the millennium. From that 
time onward the most committed believers in civil service modernisation have introduced a 
lot of new measures in the Hungarian civil service legislation, hoping to solve–at least 
partially–the problems of the costly, slow acting civil service. These deep seated problems, 
which were far from new, could not be deal with in one or even several blows. The 
modernisation measures introduced “from abroad” were not new. The countries, which 
began to apply these internationally known, quite similar modernisation attempts in the 
course of the 1980s and 1990s have by now accumulated a wealth of experience. But these 
experiences have also been enough to declare that these initiatives were not the “miracle 
cures” for all of the problems of the civil service.8 The slogans heard in the Hungarian civil 
service during the last decade were the same as those proclaimed in Western countries, 
7 Hazaﬁ , Z.: A karrier rendszerű szabályozás múltja, jelene, jövője a közigazgatásban a 
köztisztviselők jogállására vonatkozó törvény változásainak tükrében (The Past, Present and Future of 
the Career-type Regulation in Public Administration, with Special Regards to the Changes of Civil 
Service Act). Budapest, 2006.
8 See for example Bouckaert, G.: La réforme de la gestion publique change-t-elle les systèmes 
administratifs? Revue française d’administration publique, (2003) 105–106; Bouckaert, G.: 
Moderniser l’État. La route à suivre. Le Commentaire. Revue Internationale des Sciences 
Administratives, 72 (2006) 3; Bouckaert, G.: Changing World, Changing Public Administration: New 
European Trends. Conference Paper. Budapest, 2009; Gajduschek, Gy.: Egyéni teljesítményértékelés 
a magyar közigazgatásban. Egy funkcionális elemzés (Personal Performance Evaluation System in 
the Hungarian Public Administration. A Functional Analysis). Vezetéstudomány, 38 (2007) 1, 
Gajduschek, Gy.: A köztisztviselő munkájának értékelése: a magyar jogi szabályozás és a gyakorlat 
elemzése az empirikus adatok tükrében (Evaluation of the Civil Servant’s Work: Analysis of Empirical 
Data in Respect of the Regulation and Praxis in Hungary). Humánpolitikai Szemle, (2007) 11–12; 
Gajduschek: Közszolgálat… (Civil Service). op. cit.; Haque, M. S.: Moderniser l’État. La Route à 
Suivre. Sa Contribution et sa Critique. Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives, 72 (2006) 
3; Kettl, D. F.: Moderniser l’État. Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives, 72 (2006) 3; 
Linder, V.: A magyar közszolgálati humánerőforrás-gazdálkodás nemzetközi összehasonlításban (The 
Human Resource Management in the Hungarian Civil Service in International Context). Budapest, 
2009; Lőrincz, L.: A kormányzás modernizációja (The Modernization of the Government). Magyar 
Közigazgatás, (2006) 11; Lőrincz, L.: Közigazgatási reformok: mítoszok és realitás (Reforms in 
Public Administration. Mythes and Reality). Közigazgatási Szemle, (2007) 2; Premfors, R.: 
Modernising government. The way forward. International Review of Administrative Science, 72 
(2006) 3; Talbot, C: Modernising Government: The Way Forward–A Comment. International Review 
of Administrative Sciences, 72 (2006) 3; OECD: Modernising Government: The Way Forward. Paris, 
2005; OECD: Performance-related Pay Policies for Government Employees. Paris, 2005. 
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which have tried to solve the problems in their civil services–or speaking in a broader 
context in their public service–in the 1980s, and consisted mostly of applying the solutions 
of the New Public Management. However, and despite our late attempts to try to adapt 
these solutions, we paid scant any attention to the clear warnings that “Context matters”.9 
These warnings imply that modernisation efforts, which have met with some success in one 
country, will not necessarily succeed in others–particularly if the timing, economical and 
social contexts, cultural and administrative traditions, etc. are not taken into consideration. 
Another key issue and one of the potential causes of the difﬁ culties with the modernisation 
efforts in the Hungarian civil service has been the fact that the starting point of every reform 
measure has always been codiﬁ cation. This has meant that every time a modernisation 
measure has been introduced, a new legal instrument has been passed or maybe an old one 
amended. It is hardly surprising then, that when for example a management tool “copied” 
from private sector human resource management is introduced by legislative tools into a 
career civil service system, with no signiﬁ cant adaptation or testing, for almost 100 thousand 
civil servants, from one day to another, is not a success. Indeed, this kind of implanting has 
proven de-motivating for civil servants.10 Several examples of this type of attempt at reform 
can be found as we will see in the next chapter. 
IV. The most important developments in legislation in recent times
Under the aegis of the modernisation of civil service employment relationships in Hungary, 
a series of new measures have been introduced by legislative tools over the last decade. 
Most of these initiatives–following one trend–have aimed to open up the thus far quite strict 
career system, while others–following a different trend and in other aspects–have tried to 
reinforce it.
The most relevant guiding principle behind these processes has always been the aim of 
enhancing the performance of the civil service, in order to better serve the needs of the 
citizens for a better public administration, and at the same time to realize this task in a less 
costly manner. The tools for carrying out this endeavour have been ﬁ rst and foremost 
practices adapted from human resources management in the private sector. In consequence 
these tools−which have been widely tested in the civil services of many countries in recent 
years−have been adopted by passage of legislation in Hungary, too. However, due to the 
fact that the Hungarian legal system is of the German-type, a quite grotesque situation has 
emerged. Thus, the management tools which were adapted, such as various types of 
individual personal performance appraisal systems, performance-related pay and competency 
management have been accompanied by very detailed and exhaustive legal regulation. 
Furthermore, this regulation has been nationwide and unitary in character–without taking 
9 Bouckaert: Moderniser l’État... op. cit.; Haque: Moderniser l’État... op. cit.; Kettle: Moderniser 
l’État. op. cit.; OECD: Modernising Government… op. cit.; Premfors: op. cit.; Talbot: op. cit.; OECD: 
Modernising Government… op. cit.; OECD: Performance-related Pay Policies… op. cit. 
10 Following the collocation of the different stages of convergence in the ﬁ eld of public 
administration modernisation by Christopher Pollitt, these solutions in Hungary incorporate the so- 
called »decisional convergence«–when a decision is adopted on the introduction of a measure which 
ﬁ ts into a modernisation trend. The phases speciﬁ ed by Pollitt in series are discursive convergence, 
decisional convergence, practice convergence and results convergence. Pollitt, Ch.: Clarifying 
Convergence. Striking Similarities and Durable Differences in Public Management Reform. Public 
Management Review, 3 (2001) 4, 471–492; Pollitt, Ch.: Convergence: The useful myth? Public 
Administration, 79 (2001) 4, 933–947.
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into consideration the different branches of public administration, local conditions, the type 
of work, etc. Let us now consider these in greater detail. 
In 2001 the organic civil service code was amended in many of its provisions. It was 
then that the compulsory individual personal performance appraisal system for the whole 
civil service–including central, territorial and local level, state administration and 
municipalities11–was introduced. At the same time performance-related pay (PRP) was 
connected with this process. According to the provisions of the code, the head of the 
organisations of public administration had the right to adjust civil servants’ annual salaries 
by as much as minus or plus 20%, according to the results of their performance appraisal.12;13 
Of course, the payment of the performance related pay also depended on the ﬁ nancial 
circumstances of the public administration organ. According to the results of research 
carried out by the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration14 after the introduction of 
performance related pay, the civil servants were initially keen on it and felt motivated by 
the new HR-instrument, which sought to replace the existing rigid system of remuneration 
connected to seniority. After some years of experience, however, the results have been 
disappointment and demotivation: the causes of the failures were just the same as in other 
countries that had introduced PRP earlier, for example not enough budgetary tools for 
compensating good performance,15 deﬁ ciencies in measuring performance objectively, 
inequity in distribution among the organisations, but also among organisational units or 
civil servants, too many administrative tasks associated with the appraisal system, etc. 
Having confronted the failures in the functioning of PRP, but having then failed to 
remedy them, the government decided to implement a new individual personal performance 
appraisal system alongside the old one. From 2007 onwards, another type of personal 
performance appraisal system was gradually introduced for civil servants of the central state 
administration. This type of appraisal system was connected to the payment of bonuses. 
The new individual personal performance appraisal system involved a very complicated 
process, implying also a lot of administrative tasks for evaluated civil servants, as well as 
for managers and HR staff. To give an example of the complexity of the system, the new 
type of appraisal was meant to take place 4 times per year (including the self-appraisal of 
the civil servant), then at the end of the year a 5th, complex appraisal was to be carried out, 
including the whole-year evaluation of the civil servant. When it came to awarding bonuses, 
depending on the budgetary tools of the public administration organ, the number of civil 
servants awarded was pre-determined at different levels, using different methods.16 The 
amounts of the bonuses awarded also depended on the salary of the civil servant. The 
calculation method for civil servants differs from that of managers; it is of course more 
advantageous for the latter. Despite the name of this HR-tool, the new performance appraisal 
system doesn’t measure only the civil servants’ performance itself, but also his/her 
comportment and the development of his/her competency level. This means that performance 
management, competency management and performance related pay have all been included 
11 Up to 100 thousands civil servants then.
12 The process of the performance appraisal have taken place at the end of the year.
13 This rate is quite higher then the average in international praxis.
14 After decades of existence the Institute was dissolved in 2006.
15 In spite of the absence of satisfactory budgetary tools, the rate of the performance related pay 
has been modiﬁ ed in the code later up to –20% – +30%.
16 In fact, civil servants awarded by bonuses are few in numbers, but the amounts awarded for 
the few are quite high (although, in consequence of budgetary restrictions, they have been cut back). 
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in one single HR-management process. This is a situation, which the international praxis 
and literature explicitly warns against, due to the fact that competency management should 
be connected to input while performance management is linked to output. Merging them in 
a single management process is a hopeless undertaking, with many obstacles.17
It is a quite strange phenomenon that with the introduction of the new forms of 
appraisals in the last decade, there exist at present 3 types of appraisal systems in the 
Hungarian civil service. As the third type of appraisal, called the “evaluation system”, has 
been in place for many years now I will not discuss it in detail here. This evaluation system 
takes into consideration the results of the performance measurement and other facts, which 
may be relevant in connection with the work of the civil servant. This “old” evaluation 
system parallels and overlaps with the other two forms of appraisal currently in place. 
Taking into consideration the experience gained over recent years, the present setup is a 
costly, time consuming process, whose functioning has been rather demoralising for civil 
servants and managers.18 It is clear then that in order to make it more efﬁ cient it needs to be 
ﬁ ne tuned in the future.
Another element already mentioned in connection with the newly applied performance 
appraisal system is the introduction of competency management in the Hungarian civil 
service. In recent years competency management has been applied 
– as an evaluation criterion of the subsequently introduced personal performance 
appraisal (bonus) system, and
– as an element of the newly introduced recruitment and selection system.
Below I will brieﬂ y describe the new recruitment and selection system of Hungarian 
civil servants, with the accent on newly introduced elements. As mentioned below, the 
uniﬁ ed access into the civil service was not regulated in Hungary until recently. As a true 
novelty, the introduction of the centralized recruitment and selection system, which has 
taken place gradually since 2008, has been an important and widely discussed change in our 
civil service legislation. This very detailed and complicated new system has been a step in 
the direction of a strict career-like system.19 According to the legislation in force from 2008 
until 2010, applicants wishing to be employed in the civil service must meet the following 
requirements:20
1. the general conditions of acceptance–uniformly regulated for the whole civil 
service;
17 Horton, S.–Hondeghem, A.–Farnham, D.: Competency Management in the Public Sector: 
European Variations on a Theme. Amsterdam, 2002. 
18 Based on data collected during our research named »The staff of public administration« in 
the framework of the European Union’s Regional Operative Programme 3.1.1 carried out in the 
Hungarian Institute of Public Administration (leader of the research team: György Gajduschek).
19 While other measures taken at the same time–for example the facilitation of the dismissal of 
civil servants, or the restraining of the severance pay for them, among others–have broken up the 
career-like system.
20 After the parliamentary elections in 2010, this newly elaborated recruitment and selection 
system has been suspended in most of its elements. At the moment (summer 2010) the so-called 
councours (competitive entering exam) can be passed voluntary, and the competition process is not 
generally obligatory any more.
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2. the 3-stage competitive entrance exam, the so-called “concours” (1st part: multiple 
choice test, 2nd part: a set of other types of written examination, 3rd part: oral examination)–
as a general condition for acceptance;
3. the speciﬁ c conditions for acceptance–determined for speciﬁ c posts;
4. the generally obligatory competition procedure (carried out centrally in central 
administration; and also centrally published at other levels of public administration);
5. the competency evaluation(s)–in certain cases including 3 types of evaluations 
[a) interviews, b) tests for assessing the suitability of the candidate, c) assessment centres];
6. any further types of assessments when the head of the public administration organ, 
advertising the vacant post feels it necessary;
7. the generally compulsory half year-probation period.21 
As the general and speciﬁ c conditions of acceptance, these are quite similar as those 
which are in place in the other member states of the European Union, which have a civil 
service with elements of a career system. From 2009 onwards, passing the “competitive” 
entrance examination, the so called concours, has also become a general condition for 
nomination. The design of the newly introduced Hungarian concours was drawn up 
according to international standards, based on international praxis (on French examples and 
the praxis of the institutions of the European Communities). In its other fundamental 
elements, however, it has failed to meet the requirements of a real concours; a real 
competitive entering examination. In a nutshell, the Hungarian-type concours is not a truly 
competitive examination. This is due to several factors: First of all, every candidate for a 
civil service position is required to take the entrance examination, but no provision has 
been made to ensure that the candidates will be ranked according to the results they achieve. 
The new central organ responsible for the coordination of the human resources management 
of the government is able to rank candidates while taking into consideration other factors 
too (it is not clear exactly how.) In addition, the head of the organisation wishing to ﬁ ll a 
vacant post has the right to choose new colleagues at his/her discretion. The other problem 
has been that all candidates–regardless of their qualiﬁ cation, profession, the post to be ﬁ lled, 
etc.–must pass the same examination with the same content. The topic is the same for every 
candidate. (The only distinction is that people with secondary education have to meet lower 
requirements22 than those with tertiary education.) So, for example a biologist has to 
compete with a lawyer. Perhaps civil servants in English speaking countries, with completely 
different administrative cultures (and education systems) may wonder why this is a problem 
in our country. But in Hungary, with its German-type legal system, where public 
administration studies are also strictly determined by legal thinking and the knowledge 
required (also) for this examination is dominated by legal materials, equality of opportunity 
becomes highly questionable using this method. After functioning for a short period of time, 
it has become clear that if the “Hungarian-type concours” is to function in the future, this 
anomaly requires correction. 
Competency management is another newly adapted HR-management tool, which has 
recently been introduced in the Hungarian civil service system. This management tool, ﬁ rst 
applied to the HR-practice of market oriented companies several decades ago, has been a 
quite new phenomenon in public administration. In many countries competency management 
21 Linder, V.: A közigazgatás személyi állománya (The Personnel of the Public Administration). 
In: Kilényi, G. (ed.): A közigazgatási jog nagy kézikönyve (The Big Handbook of Public 
Administration). Budapest, 2008.
22 In fact the thematic has been less comprehensive for them.
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has gained ground gradually in public organisations, too. Public managers began to feel it 
necessary to adapt competency management, and use it in the HR-activity of their 
organisation in order to make it more effective and more responsive to the requirements of 
modern HR-management.23 The most important HR ﬁ eld, where most of these countries–or 
to be precise most organisations in different countries–have applied competency management 
is the selection process and the deﬁ nition of training needs. In this respect, Hungary also 
ﬁ ts into the wider trend, and there is no doubt that this management tool can add value and 
develop traditional approaches in positive ways. But there are some aspects which require 
further consideration: it is disputable whether competency management should be regulated 
by law and government decree as it is in Hungary. The real purpose of this management 
tool is to serve the needs of an organisation according to local circumstances. In order to 
meet this need it is usually the public managers who decide on its application. It is also 
unusual, and both theoretically and methodologically questionable that the evaluation of 
competencies–and what is done with the results of such evaluations–has been directly 
connected with the process of performance management and with the payment of bonuses 
(!), as we saw earlier. 
As to other elements of the relatively recently introduced, and for the moment 
suspended unitary selection system (for example the generally obligatory competition), 
which have tended–from one point of view–to strengthen the civil servants’ career system, 
it remains for the moment unclear, whether they will function in the future and when they 
do, in which way.
V. Conclusions
This article analyses the Hungarian civil service’s tentative path between the traditional 
career and the so-called position-based systems. During the transition period from the 
communist regime to a democratic rule of law, the legislation of the Hungarian civil service 
has taken the form of organic civil service legislation, which has regulated the employment 
relationships of Hungarian civil servants’–in most of its provisions–in a career system. After 
the millennium, reacting to the modernisation needs of the personnel system of public 
administration, the Hungarian legislatures introduced a lot of new measures–all of them by 
legal instructions. The new legal instruments and the amendments of old ones started to 
change the system in two directions. While some new elements aimed to dismantle the 
career-like system (for example the introduction of the performance management system 
and performance related pay, the extending of the possibilities for dismissal, etc.), others 
have deepened the career-elements (for example the introduction of a new generally 
obligatory recruitment and selection system–in a detailed and complicated procedure). 
These very frequent but not at all consistent modiﬁ cations to civil service legislation have 
resulted in an incertitude, which has done a lot of damage to the prestige of the civil service. 
After the new government came to power in the spring of 2010, it is not possible to predict 
which trend will continue in the future. The only sure thing is that the current decision 
makers would like to amend–and have already partially amended–the civil service legislation 
with just the same aims, which motivate the reform processes in all countries of the 
developed world and which have also been witnessed since roughly the middle of the 1990s 
in Hungary: cutting the costs of public administration, motivating civil servants and 
enhancing the capacity and reliability of the civil service in order to better serve the citizens’ 
needs. The newly published solutions must be analysed in another paper.
23 See Horton–Hondeghem–Farnham: Competency Management in the Public Sector… op. cit.
